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Myanmar:  
Time for Australian Defence 
Cooperation  
John Blaxland 
Change is coming quickly in Myanmar and countries like the United States and Australia are 
edging towards closer and more meaningful engagement.  A key institution needing reform is 
the Burmese military, the Tatmadaw, but to date this has been off-limits.  To affect reform in 
Myanmar requires engagement with and understanding of the Tatmadaw.  Where such 
engagement has been tried elsewhere in South East Asia through the Defence Cooperation 
Program it has produced modest and positive results.  Meanwhile, other regional powers are 
recognising the geo-strategic significance of Myanmar, astride India and China, and are 
engaging the Tatmadaw accordingly.  Australia is not so distant either and likewise has a vested 
interest in some modest and discrete engagement with the Tatmadaw.1 
Burma, or Myanmar,2 is at a crossroads and significant change is afoot.  
Since the 2010 elections and the implementation of a new constitution, 
political and economic developments in Myanmar have outpaced the West’s 
ability to respond as the new government seeks to shed its status as an 
international pariah.  But even in the case of significant and sustained 
reform, the example of other Southeast Asian countries demonstrates that 
the military’s significant influence is not going to disappear.  This article 
argues that Australia should therefore support change in Myanmar by 
directly engaging with the Burmese military, the Tatmadaw.   
Fast Paced Change in Myanmar 
At the time of writing, Myanmar’s new upper and lower houses of parliament 
are surprising even die-hard sceptics with the quality and candour of 
debates, much of which is reported in detail in the establishment’s own 
newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar.3  Myanmar has launched a range of 
economic reforms, freed hundreds of political prisoners and spurned China 
over the construction of a hydro-electric dam project on the upper reaches of 
                                                 
1
 The perspectives are informed by the fact that the author visited Naypyitaw on a number of 
occasions over three years from 2008 to 2010 and had the chance to speak with a number of 
well placed individuals within the Tatmadaw and within the diplomatic community based in 
Rangoon or Yangon, as it has become known.  
2
 The usage of Burma and Myanmar alternates throughout the article based on the historical 
context of the remarks. 
3
 See New Light of Myanmar, <http://www.myanmar.com/newspaper/nlm/index.html> [Accessed 
28 October 2011]. 
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the Irrawaddy River.4  The move to block further dam construction was 
particularly significant as it followed a number of conciliatory gestures that 
have left some suggesting that Myanmar may at last be at a real point of 
transformation.5  
The signs of reform do not end there.  Democracy icon, Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi, has been released from detention and met with the new president, Thein 
Sein, apparently in recognition of her de facto political leadership role.  As 
The Economist put it, “the government, desperate to appear more than old 
military wine in new bottles, would like her to persuade Western 
governments to lift sanctions against Myanmar”.6 
The International Crisis Group, in its September 2011 Update Briefing, also 
spoke about major political and economic reform underway and suggested 
that Thein Sein has given every indication of having the political will to put 
Myanmar on a new path.7  In a move that appears to burnish Thein Sein’s 
credentials, new legislation signed in October allows Burmese workers to 
form unions and go on strike.8   
ANU’s Burma watcher, Trevor Wilson, has highlighted some of the salient 
points.  He observed that in March 2011, the military regime handed control 
to a new government some, but not all, of whose members were in the 
previous government or former military officers.  By mid-2011, more public 
discussion of policy issues was occurring through question time and 
committees in parliament, through slightly reduced censorship in the media, 
and through the activities of elected representatives as well as of Aung San 
Suu Kyi (no longer in detention) and of the National League for Democracy.  
The new president, a former general but now elected, has called for reforms 
and appointed experts from outside the government as advisors.  These 
changes are incomplete, very imperfect, not necessarily permanent, and 
quite a long way from what would be regarded as a functioning democracy, 
but they hold the promise of further change for the first time in decades.9 
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 ‘Burma Suspends Dam Project After Rare Outcry’, Bangkok Post, 30 September 2011, 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/259117/burma-suspends-dam-project-after-rare-
outcry> [Accessed 4 October 2011]. 
5
 Asia, ‘Politics in Myanmar: A Change to Believe In?’, The Economist, 8 October 2011, p. 37. 
6
 Banyan, ‘New Light in Myanmar?’, The Economist, 17 September 2011, p. 30. 
7
 International Crisis Group, Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, Crisis Group Asia Briefing No 
127, 22 September 2001, p. 15. 
8
 ‘Burma Law To Allow Labour Unions and Strikes’, BBC News Asia-Pacific, 14 October 2011, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15303968> [Accessed 14 October 2011]. 
9
 Trevor Wilson, ‘The Costs, Achievements and Collateral Effects of Australia’s Financial 
Sanctions Against Burma (Myanmar)’, Asia Rights, Monday 4 July 2011, 
<http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/asiarights/2011/07/04/the-costs-achievements-and-
collateral-effects-of-australia%e2%80%99s-financial-sanctions-against-burma-myanmar/> 
[Accessed 4 July 2011]. 
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Wilson makes the point that the time has come to adjust our strategy to 
improve the prospects of promoting reform and protecting the changes 
already achieved.10  Similarly, renowned author and Burma commentator, 
Thant Myunt-U, said at the Australian National University Burma Update in 
May 2011 that it is time to agree to seek to engage with Burma.  He went on 
to say that the lifting of sanctions is appropriate.11  
In contrast, many in the West are struggling to understand the meaning of 
these signs.  Some say it is all a plot just to ensure that Myanmar takes over 
the rotating chair of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
2014.12  But the growing momentum suggests that this reform is a more 
significant and genuine endeavour than just one aimed at 2014.  
One of the most articulate proponents of the argument that the West should 
engage more closely now to capitalise on the emerging opportunity to 
encourage reform and a rapprochement with the West is David Steinberg, a 
noted Burma watcher and author of Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs 
to Know.  Steinberg observed recently that calls for isolation seem patently 
counterproductive to the reality of the present and the prognosis for the 
future.13   
Edging Towards Engagement 
Reflecting the changing dynamics, the United States and Australia, amongst 
others, have sent diplomatic delegations which have tentatively 
acknowledged the progress so far.  Their initiatives appear to reflect a 
growing recognition of what Thant Myunt-U, describes as the new strategic 
centrality of Burma, where Asia’s two rising giant powers, India and China, 
appear to be vying for supremacy.14  Thant-Myunt-U’s work speaks to the 
importance for Australia and other Western countries of paying increased 
attention to, and interest in, the affairs of this significant member of ASEAN. 
The United States’ Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for 
Burma, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, for instance, visited Burma in 
September 2011.  Mitchell encouraged engagement in dialogue rather than 
armed conflict with ethnic groups and affirmed the importance of legitimate 
and credible mechanisms for investigating reported abuses in ethnic areas to 
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 Trevor Wilson, ‘Hard Job to Argue for Continuing Sanction against Burma’, The Canberra 
Times, 28 June 2011, p. 11.  
11
 Thant Myunt U, Keynote Address, 2011 ANU Myanmar/Burma Update Conference, 16 May 
2011. 
12
 See for instance the accounts reported in Linda Quayle, ‘SEAview: A Pragmatic Look at 
Southeast Asian Regional Politics’, <http://southeastasiaview.blogspot.com/2011/09/ 
burmamyanmar-round-up.html> [Accessed 9 October 2011]. 
13
 David I. Steinberg, ‘Burma/Myanmar: The Triangulation of Strategic Interests’, PacNet, No. 
53, Pacific Forum CSIOS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 15 September 2011. 
14
 See Thant Myunt-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, 
(Washington, DC: SAIS, 2011). 
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build trust and promote national reconciliation.15  Mitchell said Burma had 
“opened a new chapter to a civilian-led democratic governing structure” 
suggesting they were “sincerely committed to reform in the interests of 
human rights, democracy, development, and national reconciliation”.16  
Mitchell’s concern about the detention of political prisoners was met shortly 
after by an announced release of over 6000 prisoners (although the number 
of political prisoners was not specified).17  This gesture points to Thein Sein’s 
apparent determination to prove his bona fides. 
Australia’s Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, visited from 30 June to 2 July 2011 
but avoided making any bold policy statements out of step with key partners 
in the West.  Then, in October, he stressed three new developments: First, 
on 5 September, Burma announced the establishment of a new National 
Human Rights Commission, which Rudd described as “a welcome first step”.  
Second, the parliament passed new labour laws in September 2011 to bring 
Burma more closely into line with international norms.  Finally, Rudd 
highlighted the marked relaxation of restrictions on access to international 
media websites within Burma, allowing the media to report more freely, 
including on Suu Kyi.18 
Rudd described this time as “a critical juncture for Burma”.  He said: 
Australia urges a re-commitment of all sides to existing ceasefires, to 
provide space for peaceful negotiated settlement of Burma's longstanding 
ethnic conflicts, with the Burmese government working closely with UN and 
humanitarian organisations to meet the needs of displaced and vulnerable 
populations, particularly in the southeast border areas.19 
Reflecting on the significance to Australia and the region of ensuring further 
reform is ensured, Rudd said: 
It is in our collective interests to work with those who want reform in Burma.  
A stable, more democratic and more prosperous Burma is clearly in the 
interests of the Burmese people.  It is also in Australia's and the region's 
strategic interests.  For these reasons we will do all that is in our power to 
press for the change the people of Burma so desperately deserve.  We dare 
to hope, but the jury is still out.20 
Rudd’s opinion piece suggested a desire to do more, but also reflected a 
reticence to go too far beyond what other Western leaders are prepared for.  
That reticence may well lift soon, particularly in light of subsequent 
developments. 
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 US Embassy Rangoon, Press Statement, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator, 
Ambassador Derek J. Mitchell, 14 September 2011. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid.; Stratfor, ‘Myanmar: Over 6,000 Prisoners To Be Released’, 11 October 2011. 
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 Kevin Rudd, ‘First Signs that Burma will Improve Human Rights’, The Australian, 14 October 
2011. 
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 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
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On 18 November 2011, the National League for Democracy, led by Aung 
San Suu Kyi, announced it had decided to rejoin the political process, even 
being prepared to run for office under the National League for Democracy. In 
addition, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, visited in December 
2011, meeting with Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi. This was the first 
such visit in more than half a century.21 These changes mark a significant 
departure and portend significant additional engagement. As the 
International Crisis Group reported, key benchmarks set by Western 
countries imposing sanctions appear well on their way to being met.22 
To date, arguments about engagement have focused on strengthening 
economic and cultural relations and support for the democratisation process 
in order to cement Burma’s recent development.  But no one has broached 
the topic of what to do about the country’s most significant and powerful 
institution, the Tatmadaw. 
The Armed Forces and Reform  
Consistent with its newfound reformist inclinations, the new government has 
reached out to ethnic groups to a certain extent.  But in the face of a 
resurgence of armed resistance the Tatmadaw has responded in what is 
arguably the only way it knows: by wielding a predictably heavy hand.  This 
heavy-handedness has left the Tatmadaw with growing difficulties in the face 
of mounting armed resistance from ethnic groups eager to exploit the 
apparent moment of weakness associated with the constitutional change.  
Visiting the country in August 2011, the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights in Burma, Thomas Quintana expressed concern over 
“continuing allegations of torture and ill-treatment during interrogation, the 
use of prisoners as porters for the military”.23  Quintana’s comments reflect a 
widely held concern about the odious nature of the regime’s actions against 
its own people.  It would appear Thein Sein understands this and has sought 
to reinvigorate momentum behind a new peace initiative, planning to stage 
an unprecedented national conference to address the entrenched ethnic 
divisions. The International Crisis Group observed that the country needs an 
honest reckoning with the failures of the past and a fundamental rethinking 
of how the nation handles its multi-ethnic make up, seeing a positive role for 
outsiders to play.24  But for change to come about there may need to be 
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 Banyan, ‘Reform in Thailand: Give-and-Take All Round’, The Economist, 18 November 2011, 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/11/reform-myanmar?fsrc=nlw%7Cnewe%7C11-
18-2011%7Cnew_on_the_economist> [Accessed 20 November 2011]. 
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 Asia Report No 214, Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, International Crisis Group, 
Jakarta/Brussels, 30 November 2011 at <http://ww.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-
asia/butma-myanmar/214-myan...> [Accessed 9 December 2011].  
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 Cited in Greg Sheridan, ‘West Must Ask Itself How To Engage with the Dilemma that is 
Burma’, The Australian, 13 September 2011, p. 9. 
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some outside assistance focused on engaging the military leadership, much 
as Australia has offered to other South East Asian states in recent decades. 
Meanwhile, there are considerable risks of a reverse in the country’s 
direction.  With the release of political prisoners and the opening up to the 
political opposition, significant elements in the government worry about 
social stability and their fears are exacerbated by the surge in ethnic-based 
conflicts.  The conservative inertia comes not just from military ranks but 
from government ministries as well, with many nervous about losing their 
grip on the control levers or uncertain about whether this Burmese ‘spring’ is 
a temporary lull before the return to repression and tight centralised control.  
Arguably the parallels are less with the Arab Spring than with democratising 
Indonesia in 1999—a country with many disparate linguistic and cultural 
groups which faced significant short-term turmoil before the democratic 
institutions settled into place.  
Following decades of inaction and unresponsiveness, the evidence had 
become clear that shunning the regime has achieved little so far and more 
extreme measures of intervention were too horrific to contemplate.  Indeed, 
the prospect of seeking forceful regime change by undermining the state 
authorities—in a manner approximating what happened in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
the Balkans or Libya has simply been out of the question.  Even if support for 
it could be mustered, such a course of action likely would open a Pandora’s 
box of problems that would be far greater than the alternatives.  What is 
more, in the post-GFC world, with the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ proving so 
problematic, and the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions proving to have 
been so costly and fraught, there is even less appetite for such expensive 
military interventions.   
In the absence of any prospect of forcing change from outside, there is a 
remarkable dearth of proposals to engage the Tatmadaw peacefully from the 
inside.  Neither Rudd or Mitchell or any other prominent Western leader has 
yet to seriously weigh up the costs and benefits of gradual military 
engagement to prevent an implosion of the Burmese state, to encourage the 
Tatmadaw to stop fighting armed ethnic groups, and to assist the authorities 
to improve their standards in terms of respect for human rights and 
adherence to the principles of the laws of armed conflict.  Yet arguably the 
institution most in need of reform is the Tatmadaw.  However, the subject of 
possible bilateral links between the Tatmadaw and Western armed forces 
has been considered off limits.  In the sensitive and highly-charged political 
context of Burmese affairs, wherein orthodoxy prescribes a highly critical 
stance towards the military, it has been too controversial to be discussed 
openly.  Indeed, with the rare exception of some works such as Andrew 
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Selth’s Burmese Armed Forces,25 the Tatmadaw has been an intelligence 
black hole. 
Engaging Militarised States  
Robert Taylor has made the point that much as in the constitutions of 
Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Thailand, the Tatmadaw, remains central 
to the new order.26  Yet significant military relationships are maintained by 
the West with most if not all of these countries with little international 
opprobrium heaped on those so engaged.  This speaks to the inconsistency 
in the international community’s approach, and particularly the West’s 
approach to engagement with Myanmar and the Tatmadaw.  Looking at it 
from a slightly different angle, Anthony Ware pointed out at the Burma 
Update held in Canberra in May 2011 that Myanmar’s apparent low geo-
strategic importance has meant that the United States, the United Kingdom 
and other Western countries have been able to afford to pick on Myanmar 
when it is arguably no less democratic than a number of other closer 
countries.27  Yet the striking geostrategic significance of Myanmar cannot be 
lightly dismissed.  What is more, with the United States viewing Asia 
primarily as being about China, the Chinese dimension to the situation in 
Myanmar seems to have been overlooked in the calculus of American 
strategists—even though the same calculus has been recognised in terms of 
the United States’ relationship with Vietnam.  Arguably, Australia has greater 
freedom of action in engaging with Myanmar on such issues as it is already 
more closely tied in with ASEAN and less constrained than the United States 
by institutional inertia and lobby interests. 
THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING 
Arguably, for the West to make a significant contribution to reform, it is 
imperative to try to understand how the Tatmadaw works, what forms their 
strategic perceptions and what factors influence their policy decisions.  That 
means getting involved with the Tatmadaw and learning something about 
their history, their culture and their languages.  This is what Australia has 
done with every other country in ASEAN, no matter how dissimilar their 
forms of government have been or their adherence to democratic and 
human rights principles to that in Australia.  Australia has done this for 
practical reasons and invariably so far the effects have been positive.  
THE NEED FOR ENGAGEMENT 
Anthony Ware spoke recently about rights based advocacy and the need to 
engage on a no blame basis to avoid having the door closed.28  Australian 
Army Brigadier Gavan Reynolds in a recent paper entitled Burma in 
                                                 
25
 Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge, 2003). 
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 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), p. 488. 
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 Anthony Ware, ‘Contextualisation of INGO Development Approaches to Myanmar’, 
presentation at 2011 ANU Myanmar/Burma Update Conference, 17 May 2011. 
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Transition made the point that ultimately, continued engagement with 
whatever regime is in power will enable interested parties to influence the 
government which, in turn, will give the most valuable assistance to the 
people of Burma.  This is the way forward, he said.29  It would appear that 
there is scope for Australia to play a role in reforming the Tatmadaw as well.  
In addition, with many active military officers having been sidelined from 
economic roles, it would appear a window of opportunity has opened to 
engage the military on reform-related issues.  
Impact of Australian Engagement Elsewhere in South East 
Asia 
Australia’s military engagement in South East Asia for the last few decades 
has been primarily through the multi-million dollar Defence Co-operation 
Program (DCP).  For a relatively minor investment, this program has 
generated enormous goodwill towards Australia.  It is instructive to compare 
the relationships developed by Australia’s military with other Southeast Asian 
states that are struggling to come to grips with the concept of democracy 
and the rule of law—for instance, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.  In many of 
these countries specific training has been conducted to educate military 
practitioners in the laws of armed conflict, civil society, and in the application 
of human rights in a military setting.  The term used is ‘law and leadership’: a 
cover-all term to make an otherwise relatively controversial topic more 
palatable in the target countries.  There is considerable anecdotal evidence 
that this training program has borne significant positive fruit in a number of 
South East Asian countries.  Those fruits include an improved 
consciousness of human rights and humanitarian law as well as a 
surprisingly high level of good will towards Australia for having the foresight 
and generosity to engage in this program.30  Indeed, Australia’s track record 
of engagement in a manner conducive to military reform is quietly given high 
marks by military interlocutors across the region.  Australia’s Defence 
Cooperation Program has been warmly received across ASEAN with even 
the militaries of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam benefiting from Australia’s 
expertise and largesse, focused in most cases on building confidence and 
trust and on facilitating incremental reform.  In fact, numerous officers from 
these countries’ armed forces have been glowing in their praise of Australia 
and the educational and training opportunities provided to by the Australian 
Defence Force.31 
In a country like Thailand for instance, there are hundreds of graduates of 
Australian military courses and universities trained in Australian techniques 
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 Gavan Reynolds, Burma in Transition: An Analysis, Shedden Papers, Centre for Defence and 
Strategic Studies, Weston Creek, March 2011, p. 24. 
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 In Thailand, for instance, a humanitarian law program has been incorporated into pre-
deployment training for soldiers about to deploy on military operations.  Australia’s contribution 
has directly and positively contributed to improved standards. 
31
 Author’s discussions with DCP students. 
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and procedures for restrained use of force in accordance with the principles 
of human rights and the laws of armed conflict.  These people are 
overwhelmingly well disposed to Australia.  The utility and effectiveness of 
this program in terms of leavening regional security and stability and raising 
standards of proficiency and understanding on human rights and the laws of 
armed conflict is hard to measure, but anecdotal evidence suggests this has 
been a low-key but invaluable investment in regional security.  The example 
of the success story of the DCP in other ASEAN countries is perhaps the 
most compelling reason for direct and constructive engagement with the 
Tatmadaw. 
Regional and Great Power Military Engagement 
Before considering further what Australia might propose, it is worth 
considering how the armed forces of regional powers have engaged and 
likely will continue to engage with the Tatmadaw in the coming years. 
MILITARY ATTACHES 
Military engagement is perhaps most visibly demonstrated by the presence 
in the country of a military attaché.  Countries with military attaches in 
Myanmar include China, India, Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Republic 
of Korea, Japan and a range of ASEAN countries including Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.  There are no accredited 
military attaches from the European Union.  The United States also 
maintains a fully fledged defence attaché office in the country even though 
the US State Department has only had a charge de affairs rather than an 
accredited ambassador.  Each of these countries mentioned has vested 
interests at stake which they are seeking to protect and advance. 
CHINA 
The busiest of them all are the Chinese.  With oil and gas pipelines under 
construction and access to the Indian Ocean through the port at Kyaukphyu, 
on the north-western coastline of Myanmar, China has a lot riding on 
maintaining stability within and access to and through Myanmar.  Not 
surprisingly therefore, China is regarded as the principal arms and military 
equipment supplier to the Tatmadaw.  The facilities at Kyaukphyu also 
effectively look set to give China a port in the Indian Ocean adjacent to India 
and not that far from the US base at Diego Garcia.  It would appear that 
neither India nor the United States would see this as being in their interests. 
But the events surrounding the decision concerning the Irrawadi River’s 
Myitsone Dam tend to suggest that, while the Chinese are useful to 
Myanmar, they are by no means universally popular.  Indeed, as The 
Economist explained, “the nation’s leaders also may want the West to come 
John Blaxland 
- 70 - 
back in order to balance the influence of China which has had virtually free 
reign to exploit Myanmar’s vast natural resources”.32 
INDIA 
India has maintained an extensive military and civil scholarship program in 
order to at least partly counter China’s influence and to gain access to the 
upper echelons of the Tatmadaw and the bureaucracy.  To date, however, 
their investment appears to have yielded few tangible benefits, with most 
graduates reluctant to maintain direct contact with their Indian benefactors 
once they have returned home from their studies.  Still, the graduates have 
returned to Myanmar with sound English language skills and key exposure to 
the workings of a military within a democracy.  Beyond the scholarship 
program, India has struggled to achieve a proportionate level of access and 
influence as a counterweight to that of China.  But India has been relatively 
pragmatic about this—seeing their interests largely in terms of a 
counterweight and as an important point of collaboration in case of border 
flare-ups.  With this in mind, India recently vowed US$ 500 million credit to 
improve Myanmar’s infrastructure.  The boost came shortly after the 
Burmese president met with the Indian prime minister during a four-day state 
visit in New Delhi where the two leaders agreed to expand trade operations 
and old and gas exploration activities.  India arguably has a vested interest 
in seeing an effective counterbalance to China in Myanmar and likely would 
welcome greater Australian engagement. 
RUSSIA 
Russia has sought to maintain access especially for its arms manufacturers.  
It has sold Russian fighter jets and helicopters and has maintained 
scholarship programs for bright students—notably in the field of nuclear 
science—although Russian interlocutors have claimed this program is in 
abeyance.  The Russians have not appeared overly concerned about the 
democratic credentials or otherwise of the government, so long as they 
remain interested in procuring Russian arms. 
BANGLADESH 
Bangladesh has a vested interest in maintaining stable relations due to a 
contested maritime boundary—where lucrative oil and gas reserves are 
found—and due to the ongoing challenge of unregulated border people 
movements—most notably in recent times, the Rohingya.  But Bangladesh 
struggles to gain appropriate engagement from the Tatmadaw. 
NORTH KOREA 
North Korea does not maintain a declared military attaché office but 
maintains an active embassy in Yangon—a source of considerable interest 
to the South Koreans, for instance.  The ANU’s Professor Desmond Ball has 
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identified that the Burmese have invested considerably in developing a 
nuclear industry with the potential for it to be used as the basis for 
developing or acquiring and eventually being able to use nuclear weapons.  
Not all consider the tell-tale signs of such a plan to be credible, but most 
consider the level of technical capacity and capability in Myanmar is so low 
that even if all the tell-tale signs are to be believed, it would take many years 
for the Tatmadaw to successfully acquire and operate nuclear weapons.33 
THAILAND 
Thailand has a long history of conflict with Burma but in recent years has 
placed greater priority on managing its economic relationship, with 
considerable gas resources piped across to Thailand from around the Dawei 
deep sea port being developed in the Bay of Bengal.  Militarily, however, its 
relationship is limited primarily to border committees established to resolve 
local tensions.  Beyond that there are no significant bilateral military 
activities.  At the same time, Thailand has a vested interest in bolstering the 
utility of ASEAN, headed by Thailand’s former foreign minister, Surin 
Pitsuwan.  To that end, the emergence of Myanmar as a constructive 
contributor to ASEAN and a supporter of rather than hindrance to greater 
Western engagement in the region would be seen by Thai authorities as in 
their interests. 
JAPAN 
Since the ignominious withdrawal of Japanese forces at the end of World 
War II, Japanese military engagement in Burma has been very low key with 
a modest defence attaché office facilitating minimal engagement.  On the 
other hand, Japan’s Foreign Minister, Koichiro Gemba, has recently called 
for strengthening of economic and cultural relations with Myanmar and 
Japan has been known as a relatively generous aid donor.34  
THE UNITED STATES 
Engagement by the US military with the Tatmadaw does not appear likely in 
the foreseeable future.  Washington insiders have sometimes labelled the 
Burma question a ‘boutique issue’ as it does not appear to strike directly at 
clear and present concerns to US national interests.35  As Andrew Selth 
observed, notwithstanding the United States’ recognition that Myanmar 
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occupies a sensitive geostrategic position between the nuclear armed giants 
of India and China, Washington is unlikely to make any significant changes 
to its Burma policy without first considering the views of Aung San Suu Kyi.36  
He may have added that the United States’ congressional constraints on 
executive presidential action significantly encumbers the State and Defence 
Departments from creatively seeking to engage with prominent military 
personnel. 
Options for Australia 
THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
The limitations in the approaches of the countries mentioned above, point to 
the space available for a constructive approach to engagement from 
Australia.  Australia has a clear and genuine interest in bolstering regional 
security and seeking to bolster civil society across ASEAN.  In fact, the 
Australian military has an impressive track record of being involved in reform 
initiatives across South East Asia through the Defence Cooperation 
Program.  Myanmar stands as a glaring exception and, given the changing 
political dynamics, this warrants re-examination.  Australia’s current posture 
allows for little direct engagement with the authorities.  Yet as we have seen, 
the institution of the military in Myanmar can be expected to continue its 
prominent role in society for the foreseeable future.  
IMPORTANCE OF PROXIMITY 
All these countries mentioned so far recognise the self evident strategic 
significance of Myanmar, yet they place different emphasis, depending on, 
by rough rule of thumb, what equates to the issue of proximity.  Like Thant 
Myunt-U, David Steinberg has described Myanmar as geographically 
strategic, being sandwiched between the great and growing cultural, 
economic and military powers of China and India and contiguous with US-
ally Thailand.  Myanmar’s neighbours bear what he describes as “the burden 
of proximity” whereas those further away have the “luxury of distance”.37  
Australia could perhaps be described as somewhere in the middle on this 
spectrum.  For Australia, the position is different to that of other Western 
countries: Australia is not so distant.  For Australia, Myanmar is one of the 
few countries in South East Asia without a permanently stationed military 
attaché (the others being Laos and Brunei).  But Australia maintains a non-
resident attaché in part to facilitate access to military authorities, and also 
because, as AusAID’s (The Australian Agency for International 
Development) Richard Moore said recently, on the question of Myanmar 
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Australia has always been a little bit more pragmatic and flexible than the 
European Union.38   
UNDERSTANDING HISTORY 
If Australia is to engage with the Tatmadaw and to speak to them without 
what is said being completely rejected or ignored, then a sound 
understanding of their real fears and premonitions is important.  It is worth 
reflecting on the historical context, starting with the granting of independence 
after World War II.  Given the fundamental issue of self preservation, the two 
principal areas the people in power have enduring concerns about include 
(1) national unity, fearing balkanisation, as manifested in the plethora of 
ongoing ethnic conflicts; and (2) external threats, fearing intrusion from 
outside as illustrated by the repeated invasions by British, Japanese and 
Chinese forces over the last few centuries.  In its post colonial history, 1948 
saw the military play a prominent role in the creation of the state of Burma.  
Fourteen years later, in 1962 the experiment with civilian-controlled 
democracy came to an end.  Then the army, under General Ne Win, set 
about creating a militarised form of socialism.  By 1988 this had failed but the 
military reasserted itself through the onomatopoeically named SLORC—the 
State Law and Order Restoration Committee, subsequently renamed the 
more genteel-sounding State Peace and Development Committee or SPDC.  
Twenty years later the military still called the shots in arranging a 
constitutional transition from a military-run government to a military-
controlled government.  As Robert Taylor points out,  
more than 60 years of internal strife and political discord have created an 
army which, no matter what the constitution says, will probably prevail in 
any future political conflicts.39 
To be sure, as Ashley South observed, the Tatmadaw is an agent of—often 
brutal—suppression in the country which it is supposed to protect.40  This 
reported brutality makes any form of military engagement politically risky.  
Nonetheless, the point here is that the Tatmadaw is not going away.  If a 
genuine concern for the people of Myanmar is to be manifest, then 
engagement with this institution will be critical.  Indeed, some kind of 
resolution of the conflicts would appear an important precursor to any 
significant diminution in human rights concerns.  Armed with such 
understanding, modest reform-minded engagement may be able to begin to 
address issues of concern to the international community. 
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ASEAN TIES 
Australia’s interests in seeking a resolution to the Burma question stems 
largely from its relative proximity to Myanmar as well as its extensive and 
important institutional ties with the other countries of ASEAN.  For Australia, 
ASEAN is not of little consequence and therefore in terms of Australia’s 
national interests, Myanmar is not a ‘boutique’ issue either.  Consequently, 
Australia has been prepared to maintain official contact and engagement 
through AusAID with development scholarships as well as considerable relief 
and development related projects.  Similarly, the Australian Federal Police 
has remained engaged through its regionally-focused law enforcement 
programs.41  But Australia has not been prepared to appear to get its hands 
dirty by being associated with the Tatmadaw in seeking actively to generate 
reform initiatives.  
RESIDENT DEFENCE ATTACHÉ 
A first step for Australia might be to establish a permanently-based defence 
attaché in the country.  Only by being in the country, engaging with the 
military authorities, learning the language and seeking to understand the 
culture and the people will any real inroads be achievable.  This should be a 
start point if Australia is serious about seeking to be an agent for reform in 
the Tatmadaw. 
EDUCATION REFORM 
One area where reform and assistance is needed is in the area of education.  
Once a leading light academically in the region, Myanmar has slipped far, 
particularly following the closing of universities and the strict monitoring and 
control of remaining tertiary educational institutions.  Today the premier 
tertiary institution is not the University of Rangoon but the Defence Services 
Academy or DSA in Pyin Oo Lwin north-east of Mandalay.  In 2009 the DSA 
had a graduating class of 2500 students—up from only about 350 a few 
years earlier.  The surge appears to have been geared for producing a large 
crop of military-trained officers to manage the transition to so-called civilian 
rule and to participate in the administration of the country.  Interestingly 
enough, the DSA attracts candidates from across the country, arguably 
being one of the most relatively egalitarian institutions in the country where 
advancement is based largely on merit.  With no comparable opportunities 
elsewhere in Myanmar, the DSA attracts people from all walks of life.  
Indeed, it would appear that the prominent role of the military in society and 
in tertiary education will remain a feature for the foreseeable future in 
Myanmar.  Attempts at addressing the question of good governance, 
therefore, would likely need to involve the Tatmadaw as well.  Engagement 
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in some form of exchange with the DSA would be a bold and constructive 
move. 
BUILDING PEACE AND RECONCILIATION 
The settlement of Burma's longstanding ethnic conflicts, is perhaps the most 
significant outstanding issue which generates the most concerns about 
human rights abuses and which contributes to the opprobrium heaped on the 
Burmese state.  But if the current government’s overtures are a true 
indication, then there is a real need for countries like Australia to do what 
they can to engage in the problem and to help the people of Myanmar find 
resolution and lasting peace.  Australia has a proud tradition of assisting in 
other regional countries’ disputes, in places such as Cambodia, in helping to 
resolve disputes and map a path out of the political problem being faced.  To 
be sure, Myanmar is not like Cambodia was at the end of the Cold War, with 
the opportunity for a UN intervention.  But perhaps there is scope for some 
innovative thinking about how to help the people of Myanmar to find peace 
and reconciliation, in such a way that the government is not scared into 
rejecting any overtures and in a way which actually addresses the concerns 
of human rights groups and other interested parties.  Perhaps a fact-finding 
team could be put together with Australia playing a prominent role to 
ascertain what can be done to bring about a lasting peace within this 
troubled country.  Conceivably such a team could be managed under the 
auspices of the UN or ASEAN and could involve military officers, and expert 
advisers on peace and conflict resolution, ethnography and Burmese history 
and culture. 
Conclusion 
Australia should have the courage and the vision to engage with the 
Tatmadaw now that it is facing a new political context.  To be sure, there are 
risks and it is easier and arguably safer to criticise from afar and avoid any 
opprobrium that may accrue from being seen to be involved with the 
Tatmadaw.  But that would be an approach that borders on hypocrisy.  
Australia should have the courage and conviction to seek engagement with 
the Tatmadaw to not only press for reform but to offer to assist in bringing it 
about as a partner in fostering regional stability and security.   
Australia is perhaps the only country in the West that is well placed to do 
this.  Australia is recognised as being of the region, yet without the baggage 
of a superpower or a former colonial power.  What is more, Australia has, for 
decades now, consistently engaged militarily across the region through the 
Defence Cooperation Program, having participated in various ASEAN fora 
and having contributed generously and altruistically in Myanmar with aid 
following Cyclone Nargis in 2007.42  There is an opportunity for Australia to 
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be at the forefront in such engagement through the extension of the Defence 
Cooperation Program to cover Myanmar as well. 
This can happen if Australia has the vision and the courage to do so.  A 
discrete and modest approach from a responsible and concerned regional 
partner like Australia may be surprisingly well received.  Indeed, if we really 
care about the suffering of the people of Myanmar and want to see change 
in the order of things then arguably this is an important step. 
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